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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
There is considerable justification for the dissent's fears that a "Pandora's
box" of false claims will be opened and that a judge or jury might be convinced
of a causal connection by "purchased" expert medical testimony. If there were
no merit in these apprehensions, perhaps Mitchell would have fallen much
sooner. But the exceptions to the rule have shown that it does not effectively
eliminate many bad claims, but may only inhibit the prosecution of many good
ones. And while medical testimoy may be presented by the plaintiff to support
an unjust claim, it may also be used by the defense to disprove it.
Future cases may prove the decision in Battalla to be the wrong one. But
it is more likely, looking at the experience of other "non-impact" states, that
the majority will be vindicated. In the tradition of Rumsey v. New York &
N.E.R.R. Co.32 and more recently Woods v. Lancet,33 the Court has reexam-
ined a much-criticized rule of the past "without fear, and revised without
reluctance, rather than to have the character of our law impaired, and the
beauty and harmony of the system destroyed by the perpetuity of error. " 34 The
exceptions to and deviations from Mitchell had left this area of New York case
law in an uncertain state. By the instant decision, the Court of Appeals has
relieved much of this confusion and aligned itself with the reasoned position
and not-unhappy experience of the majority of states.
R.V.B.
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT No LONGER NEEDED IN CERTAIN WARRANTY ACTIONS
Until recently, the New York courts had continued unchanged the long
standing rule that recovery in warranty, express or implied, could not be allowed
in the absence of privity of contract.35 The rule rested on the concept that
a warranty is an incident of a contract, running only between the seller and one
in contractual relationship (privity) with him.36 Under the rule, retail dealers,
manufacturers, and wholesalers stood immune to warranty actions by claimants
other than the actual purchasers of injurious products.
The obvious harshness of the rule prompted the courts to fashion imagi-
native devices to supply or, more accurately, evade the privity rule in finding
for certain nonpurchaser claimants. A long line of cases has used the device of
the agency doctrine. The Court of Appeals first applied the device in Ryan v.
Progressive Stores, Inc. 37 to permit a claimant, whose wife was the actual
purchaser, to recover in warranty on the ground that the wife acted as the
claimant's agent. The mere relationship of husband and wife gave rise to
the presumption that the husband's funds were used to make the purchase.
Other agency cases have included such successful claimants as: the'sister of the
32. 133 N.Y. 79 (1892).
33. 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
34. Kent's Com. (13th ed.) 477, cited in Woods v. Lancet, supra note 33 at 355, 102
N.E.2d at 694.
35. Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928).
36. Fairbank Canning Co. v. Metzger, 118 N.Y. 260, 23 N.E. 372 (1890).
37. 255 N.Y. 512, 157 N.E. 828 (1927).
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actual purchaser,38 the wife of the actual purchaser,30 and the guest of the
actual purchaser. 40 The position of the infant nonpurchaser claimant helped
lead to the fashioning of the second device, since the use of the agency doctrine
in favor of the infant would have necessitated the unlikely presumption that
the child's money was spent for the purchase. In the lone case employing the
device of the third-party beneficiary doctrine the court reasoned that the
parent had made the purchase for the benefit of the child, and thus the purchase
was in effect a third-party beneficiary contract.41 It should be noted that the
courts have generally limited recovery to actions involving injurious food
products.42 Thus, the courts have in the past been satisfied to confine their
efforts in expanding warranty protection on behalf of nonpurchaser claimants
to the fashioning and use of devices to evade the privity rule rather than any
attempt to directly alter the rule, itself.
The present case, Greenberg v. Lorenz,43 seems for the first time to dispense
with the royal seal of privity. The Court of Appeals held that an infant, whose
father was the actual purchaser, could recover against a retailer for breach
of warranties of fitness and merchantability44 in the sale of a can of salmon
having bits of metal concealed in the fish. Chief Judge Desmond concluded,
"Today when so much of what we eat is bought in packages it is not just or
sensible to confine the warranty's protection to the individual buyer. At least
as to food and household goods, the presumption should be that the purchase
was made for all the members of the household.1 45
It is significant that the Court speaks beyond the infant claimant in the
case to such other nonpurchaser claimants as comprise the "members of the
household." Presumably, any of the nonpurchaser claimants coming within this
category will in the future be accorded the benefit of the distinct doctrine of the
case. It is also reasonable to expect that the nonpurchaser claimants permitted
recovery under the agency doctrine will eventually be included under the new
doctrine. Moreover, since the Court's basis for allowing recovery is the
arbitrary discrimination against nonpurchaser claimants caused by the privity
rule, the same arbitrary discrimination posed by the "members of the household"
limit promises a further broadening of the class of permissible claimants.
Similarly, the Court's words go beyond food items (although the case deals
38. Bowman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 284 A.D.2d 663, 133 N.Y.S.2d 904(4th Dep't 1954), aff'd without opinion, 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 165 (1955).
39. Gimenez v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934).
40. Welsh v. Schiebelhuth, 11 Misc. 2d 312, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
41. Parrish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7
(Munic. Ct. 1958).
42. In Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953)
the Court in passing on a statute of limitations point did not dismiss the cause, as it might
have, on the ground that the warranty protection accorded nonpurchasers extended to food
items and not to the clothing item involved in the case.
43. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
44. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 96 (1) (2).
45. Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 43 at 215, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
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precisely with canned salmon only) to include "food and household goods."
The product class may predictably grow to include even items of clothing. 46
Professor Prosser has said in this regard, "It is not difficult to predict a process
of development similar to that of the maker's liability in negligence, which will
extend first to products involving a high degree of risk, and perhaps eventually
to anything which may be expected to do harm if defective."'4 7 The fruition of
this now famous prediction appears to be more than a possibility in our courts
after this decision.
Not only does the Court's holding seem to embrace an extensive number of
new claimants and fresh products, but it also announces a clean break with the
privity rule. The opinion is quite frank about the "nonprivity" of the infant
claimant. No attempt is made to guise the holding in the agency doctrine or
the third-party beneficiary doctrine. The Court speaks in terms of "change"
in the privity rule, itself, and inquires into the origin of the rule in justifying
such change. Simply stated, the Court holds that privity is no longer a
prerequisite in certain warranty actions. Thus, the privity rule seems to have
given way at least in a limited area to a more realistic approach to warranty
claims.
The only noticeable pause the Court takes in coming to its decision is the
short time given to resolving the propriety of judicial change in the rule as
opposed to legislative change. The Court argues that the privity rule is in its
origin merely a rule of judicial making, and, moreover, that no insistence on the
rule can be found in the statutes. Justice Froessel in a separate concurring
opinion, while acknowledging the correctness of the present change, expressed
doubt as to the propriety of future judicial change. He points to the inequity
of holding a retailer liable where there is no fault on his part for the injurious
character of the packaged food he sells. The plight of the retailer, he believes,
approximates the unjust situation that the nonpurchaser claimant has been
placed in by the privity rule. He urges that the dilemma of choosing between
the innocent retailer and the misfortunate nonpurchaser claimant be left to
legislative investigation and determination.4"
The importance of the present case is that it discernibly stands for the
first clean, if limited, break with the privity rule in warranty actions and
foretells of the further dispensation of the rule in an increasing number of cases.
D. P.S.
ATTACK ON MANUFACTURER'S PRODUCT MAY IMPUGN His INTEGRITY AND BE
ACTIONABLE WITHOUT PROOF OF SPECIAL DAMAGES
In Harwood Pharmacal Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.,49 plaintiff
46. Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., supra note 42.
47. Prosser, Torts 510 (2d ed. 1955).
48. For a discussion of the propriety of judicial change in the privity rule in New
York see Note, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 290 (1959).
49. 9 N.Y.2d 460, 214 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1961).
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